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Abstract
The increasing transparency of central banks’ internal communication
and decision-making methods has been a global trend in the past fifteen
years. Especially since the financial crisis in 2008, the general public has
demanded greater transparency from governments and major market par-
ticipants. This paper examines how the increase in information about the
conduct and expectations of central banks affects unemployment rates and
price level changes, especially in the context of a society in which there
is a significant union presence. It finds that greater transparency fails to
improve welfare when public information is released in such a way that
agents place too little weight on their own information and when there is
an uncoordinated-wage-decision externality among unions.
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1 Introduction
As central banks around the world continue to increase the amount of information
they make available to the public, we want examine the assumption that greater
transparency leads to both greater effectiveness of monetary policy, and to more
socially beneficial outcomes. With a closer examination into what information
central banks release and how that information is perceived by the public, a greater
understanding of the effectiveness of monetary policy can be achieved.
To do this, we examine two models. The first, by James and Lawler (2010),
examines how information released by the central bank affects an economy char-
acterized by monopolistic competition and homogeneous private information. The
second, from a paper by Angeletos and La’O (2009), looks at how public infor-
mation affects an economy with perfect competition between firms and decision-
making made based on heterogeneous information.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the his-
torical development of monetary policy in central banking. Section 3 talks about
the various methods central banks have of increasing their transparency, and how
the availability of information affects higher-order beliefs, section 4 presents an
attempt by James and Lawler (2010) to model the effects of transparency when
wage-setters have access only to homogeneous information, and section 5 is a for-
malized extension of this model, in which the wage-setters act under heterogeneous
information. Section 6 concludes.
2 Development of Central Banking Policy
Until the 1990s, conventional wisdom held that those in charge of monetary policy
should say as little as possible about their motives and future policy decisions
(Blinder et al., 2008). Today, the mainstream opinion of those involved in central
banking is the exact opposite. Monetary policy is now seen as the art of managing
the expectations of the public, with the financial instruments directly controlled
by central banks, such as overnight interest rates, considered less important than
the information the bank sends out (Morris & Shin, 2008). How the central bank’s
messages affect markets and individuals is of particular concern.
A movement towards greater transparency continues in the hopes that allowing
the public to access more information about central banks’ motives and actions
will have positive outcomes for both social welfare and for allowing monetary
policy to have its intended effects on financial markets (Blinder et al. 2008, James
& Lawler 2010). But what do we mean, exactly, by the term "transparency?"
One interpretation is that it is a metaphor for any feature of the central bank
which influences the private sector’s expectations about future monetary policy,
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and hence future economic development (Jensen, 2002). Transparency can also be
thought of as the degree of accuracy of the signals the central bank releases. When
the signals become more accurate in regards to the exact nature of an economic
shock, we say that the bank has become more transparent (James & Lawler, 2010).
2.1 Historical Background
The persistent problem of "stagflation" in the 1960s and 1970s led to increased
interest in regards to if, and how, monetary policy could stabilize prices while
reducing unemployment. The degree of discretion a central bank should be per-
mitted to exercise was of interest as well. When a central bank is operating under
complete discretion, it is free at any time to alter its policy settings.
In 1985, Kenneth Rogoff proposed that, under certain circumstances, society
can make itself better off by appointing a "conservative" central banker to handle
monetary policy. The conservative agent’s objective function would be different
than society’s objective funcion and would place "too large" an emphasis on sta-
bilizing the price level compared to stabilizing unemployment. The central banker
would, however, be able to change the weights given to unemployment and price
level stabilization depending on the current state of the economy. The greater
emphasis on price level stability would reduce the time-consistent rate of inflation,
but would increase the variance of employment during realizations of large supply
shocks (Rogoff, 1985). This idea of "intermediate monetary targeting" was a de-
parture from the traditional idea that the central bank needs to rigidly adhere to
a strict feedback rule, which Rogoff advised central banks to do only under very
special circumstances.
The theory behind appointing a conservative central banker has since gone out
of favor. Rogoff only considered an economy with an atomistic labor market, in
which wage-setting agents have no market power. Lawler (2000) showed that, in
an economy where wages are set by a single union representing all workers, it is
optimal for the central bank to care only about employment. Skott (1997) found
that when there are labor unions in the economy, a central bank that is totally
indifferent to the level of inflation may obtain outcomes with zero inflation and
high unemployment, while inflation-averse banks may end up with high inflation
and low unemployment. As the true state of the labor market lies somewhere in-
between being completely atomistic and represented by a single union, there there
is still debate as to how exactly the central bank should conduct monetary policy.
2.1.1 Time Inconsistency Problem
In addition to finding ways to combat stagflation, there was the issue of trying
to find an optimal monetary policy that was time consistent. A policy is time
2
consistent if some action planned at time period t for time period t + 1 is still
optimal to implement when time period t + 1 actually arrives (Walsh, 2003). A
time-consistent policy can, of course, depend on the realization of events which
are unknown when the policy is designed. Then, in order to be time-consistent,
the planned response to new information must remain the optimal policy when
the new information arrives.
The undesirablility of time-inconsistent policies is related to the credibility
of central banks and their communication with the public. If the central bank
conducts monetary policy according to a systematic rule, and if this rule if publicly
available, theoretically the public could predict the bank’s optimal behavior for its
objective function. Market participants would then adjust their investment and
spending patterns to account for the bank’s future actions. These adjustments
lead to more efficient market outcomes, but only if the central bank commits to
its future policies, i.e. acts in a time-consistent manner.
In many dynamic problems, economic performance can be improved by chang-
ing the policy in the future from what is announced in the present (Taylor, 1983).
Unless the central bank has a way to credibly precommit to policies, or is required
to adhere to certain policies, it will try to make changes when new information
or situations arise, especially when private agents have precommitted to wage and
price decisions. If private agents believe that the central bank is not committed to
its current monetary policy, the agents will include the possiblity of policy changes
into their nominal prices and wages, so that adjustments to monetary policy will
not affect real macroeconomic variables. In the 1970’s, several influential papers
were published stating that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a central
bank to conduct monetary policy in a way that is both optimal and time-consistent.
Kydland and Prescott’s seminal paper found that, under discretionary mone-
tary policy and rational expectations, the social objective function will not typi-
cally be maximized (Kydland & Prescott, 1977). They point out that the decisions
of economic agents depend not only on current and past decisions, but on their
expectations of future actions. These expectations change as current plans change,
so if, in each period, the selected policy is the one which maximizes the sum of
the value of current outcomes and the discounted valuation of the end-of-period
state, the selected policy will be time consistent but not optimal. This paper drew
more attention to the issues surrounding the central bank’s ability to believably
precommit to policies (Walsh, 2003).
Calvo (1978) examined the time consistency of Ramsey-Friedman optimal pol-
icy, in which one maximizes a sum of instantaneous utilities that depends on
consumption and real monetary balances. He found that the optimal monetary
policy will be time-inconsistent even when the government tries to maximize the
welfare of the representative household. This is because the amount of real mon-
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etary balances that people are willing to hold in the current time period depends
on the rate of inflation between the current and subsequent time periods. If pri-
vate agents owe the government even a small amount, then the government has an
incentive to decrease the price level, so that the nominal value of these debts in-
crease. However, if the government were to do this often, they would face a severe
credibility issue and the costs from this price level mainupulation would probably
be greater than the gains from increasing the value of their loans.
Despite these grim predictions as to the impossiblity of finding a time-consistent
and socially-optimal monetary policy, in the past decade it has been shown that,
under certain conditions, it is theoretically possible for such a policy to exist.
Alvarez et. al (2004) show that optimal policies will be time consistent for a
class of monetary economies commonly used in applied work. These economies do
not include any capital and the policy chosen by the government in the first period
ends up being the policy used by all successor governments. This monetary policy
is known as the Friedman rule and sets the nominal interest rate equal to zero and is
the optimal policy under commitment. By carefully constructing the government’s
maturity structure of nominal and real debt, successor governments will not be
tempted to change the price level in order to inflate or deflate their nominal claims.
There are two main ideas behind these findings. Firstly, the government’s primary
influence over successor governments comes form the appropriate setting of real
debt as opposed to nominal debt. Secondly, when the Friedman rule is not optimal,
the government does not have enough free debt instruments to coerce its successor
into continuing the present government’s plan.
In a slightly different situation, Calvo and Obstfeld show that, when the gov-
ernment has an infinite planning horizon, is it possible for the social planner’s
optimal allocation to be time consistent. Other requirements for time consistency
in their model inculde the ability of the government to distinguish between dif-
ferent groups of people when making lump-sum transfers and the availability of
sufficient policy tools available to the planner.
2.2 Central Bank Independence
Though constructing a socially-optimal and time consistent monetary policy is
theoretically possible, it is clear that implementing such a policy in real life would
be extremely difficult. The idea that central banks would be tempted to change
their publicly-announced policies for immediate gain and thus lose their credibility
with the public brings us to the debate about the amount of control governments
should have over monetary policy.
The departure of the central bank’s short-term goals from those of the wage-
setters is a main reason for many central banks’ relatively large degree of autonomy
today. If the central bank could be easily pressured by unions or various interest
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groups into giving more weight to reducing unemployment variability, then the
central bank’s response to variations in employment and inflation would be optimal
for certain subgroups of the population, but may not be the best policy for society
as a whole. However, it is not beneficial for the central bank to focus soley on
reducing inflation. All major central banks include improving the well-being of
society as a main (or ultimate) reason for their existence and doing so involves
stabilizing the unemployment rate to some extent. Another reason for granting
central banks some level of independence is that, during the last two decades,
both theoretical and empirical research has shown that central bank independence
is associated with lower inflation while not being associated with lower growth
(Cukierman, 2001).
In addition to affecting domestic macroeconomic variables, the issue of central
bank independence is increasingly important in international financial and mon-
etary cooperation (Maxfield, 1994). In order to mainstain stable exchange rates,
monetary authorities in different governments need to be able to coordinate differ-
ent monetary policies. For the coordination efforts of the central bank to appear
credible, there needs to be a guarantee of central banks’ monetary authority and
independence from their naitonal governments.
A central bank has goal independence when it is free to conduct monetary
policy as it wishes. Its government may require the central bank to reach certain
targets, and impose penalties for not reaching those targets. When this happens,
the central bank does not have goal independence, only instrument independence
(Herrendorf & Lockwood, 1997). Governments usually give a clearly defined man-
date to central banks, which can be quantative or qualitative.
Even if a central bank is not given a specific numerical target, it may announce
that it will try and reach a certain target of its own quantification (Blinder et al.,
2008). Quantitative targeting allows the central bank and others to assess the cen-
tral bank’s ability in reaching its desired goals, and helps anchor the expectations
of the public. Well-anchored inflation expectations help stabilize actual inflation
by removing a major source of shocks, making it easier for a central bank to affect
real inflation just by credibly stating it wants to keep inflation at a certain level.
2.3 Commitment Versus Discretion
Unsurprisingly, there disagreement among academics and policy makers as to
whether economic outcomes are better when central banks commmit to follow-
ing certain policy rules, or if they should change their policies as the economic
climate changes. One extreme would be for the policy maker to constantly be
adjusting all of the variables under the central bank’s control to any value she
wished in order to reach her short-term goals, which may change frequently. The
other extreme is that the central bank strictly complies with a stated policy rule,
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whether that be mandated or voluntary, and does not change these rules or goals
over long periods of time. The central bank is said to have discretion if it varies its
policies with changes in its private information, and conventional wisdom is that
optimal outcomes can be achieved only if the monetary authority is given some
level of discretion (Athey et al., 2005).
As many central banks today are at least some degree separate from their
governments, the issue of how much discretion they should use when economic
shocks arise is of increasing interest. There is a tradeoff between maintaining the
credibility needed to keep inflation low and the flexibility necessary to conduct
stabilizing monetary policy (Cukierman, 2001).
Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) showed that the optimal degree of discre-
tion depends on the severity of the time inconsistency problem and the usefulness
of private information in the examined society. With a severe time inconsistency
problem and little useful private information, it is optimal to allow the central bank
no discretion. The government can ensure the optimal monetary policy is imple-
mented by enforcing a simple inflation cap, which would vary with developments
in publicly available information.
However, a discretionary regime can be more flexible. The real-time aspect of
choosing whether to operate under committment or discretion means that opting
for discretion in the current time period leaves open the possiblity of the central
bank moving to a committment regime in the future (Haubrich & Ritter, 2000).
The value of having the option to wait increases as uncertainty increases. Howver,
if the central bank waits too long to decide how to conduct policy, their credibility,
and therefore policy effectiveness, may suffer.
2.4 Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
Of course, any discussion about which economic aggregates a central bank should
spend its efforts stabilizing is pointless if the central bank’s monetary changes have
no effect on the economy. New classical economists maintain that if the private
sector rationally anticipates the central bank’s policies, monetary policy cannot
affect real behavior. The reasoning is that, in order for monetary policy to induce
changes in real output, it has to be able to cause unexpected movements in the
price level (Sargent & Wallace, 1975). From the assumption that expectations of
the price level are rational, logic tells us there is no systematic rule the central bank
can follow that allows it to affect the price level unexpectedly. Any changes in the
money supply will be accounted for by the wages set by the unions. The central
bank could add an unpredictable random term to its money supply function, but
this would not enable them to establish a systematic countercyclical monteary
policy.
Others argue that it seems inconceivable that large and influential unions would
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not change their real wage behavior in response to the anticipated effects of mone-
tary policy (Lucas, 1976). If the unions’ expectations are not allowed to change as
monetary policy changes, their expectations are no longer rational. The changes
in the private sector’s policies would have an effect on unemployment, so it is not
unreasonable for the central bank’s behavior to have consequences for both infla-
tion and unemployment. Additionally, the combination of the barganing structure
and the central bank’s policies have been shown to determine the equilibrium level
of unemployment, even when all parties have rational expectations and complete
information (Iversen, 1998).
A situation in which the private sector has complete information can arise
only when there is complete transparency about the behavior and motivations of
the central bank and when all parties involved are paying close attention to this
information. Until banks increase the amount of information to such an extent
that the public is perfectly informed of the bank’s actions and motivations, we
can expect that the central banks’ monetary policies will affect the price level and
possibly unemployment. It is the ability of the central bank to release information
which affects macroeconomic variables that brings us to the issue of increasing
central bank transparency.
3 Transparency
The increasing transparency of central banks’ internal communication and decision-
making methods has been a global trend in the past fifteen years. Especially since
the financial crisis in 2008, the general public has demanded greater transparency
from governments and major market participants (Morris & Shin, 2002). There
are two main reasons for increasing the transparency of central banks.
The first is the common sentiment that, in a democratic society, the public has
the right to know what the central bank is doing and what it wants to achieve.
Opaqueness is often associated with secrecy and dishonesty, and so an increase in
central bank information could increase the general public’s trust in the financial
system (Jensen, 2002). When a central bank is democratically accoutable, mech-
anisms are in place for elected officials to override the central bank’s actions and
stated objectives (Cukierman, 2001). If the central bank must answer to the public
in some way or face penalties, it will need to explain its actions and movtivations.
These explanations increase transparency and allow the public to be aware of any
actions committed by the central bank that go against the will of the people. The-
oretically, greater transparency would lead monetary policies that are of greater
social benefit to the majority of society.
As explained earlier, there is also a benefit to having a mostly-independent
central bank. However, its members and policies will still be, at some level, de-
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termined by the government, which (hopefully) is elected by the general public.
Transparency may compensate somewhat for the "democratic loss" that society
incurs from central bank independence (Jensen, 2002).
The second and more commonly stated benefit of increasing transparency is
that communicating with the public makes the central bank more predictible to
markets. When markets can accurately predict central bank policy, they will re-
spond more efficiently to changes in those policies. They can conduct transactions
that maximize economic growth by minimizing the economic loss that comes from
expectational errors (Poole, 2001). These expectations lead to private sector in-
ferences about future economic developments and to real movements, especially in
forward-looking variables. How investors form their future expectations in reaction
to central bank announcements depends greatly on the central bank’s perceived
commitment to its policy rules, the nature of the policy announcement, current
market conditions, and the amount of information currently available.
Exactly how central bank information affects the public, and to what degree
depends greatly on the communication style of the individual bank. Even if two
central banks follow the same monetary policy, they may have drastically different
communication policies, which can have different effects on financial markets.
3.1 Information Releases
Central banks release information on four major aspects of monetary policy: their
overall objectives and strategy, their motives behind a particular policy decision,
their opinion on the state of the economy and their predictions of future monetary
policy decisions (Blinder et al., 2008). Below we examine the policies of the Federal
Reserve System (the Fed), the Bank of England (BoE), and the European Central
Bank (ECB). In addition to being three of the world’s major central banks, these
banks showcase different communication methods used in monetary policy.
3.1.1 Objectives and Strategy
The ultimate goal of all central banks is to provide a stable means of payment
(Schwartz et al., 2009). This is achieved mostly by maintaining the stability of
the country’s or region’s currency. In the early days of central banking, achieving
high rates of employment and long-term growth were considered to be of equal
importance to ensuring price stability. Most central banks now state that price
stability, or keeping inflation close to zero percent, is their foremost policy goal.
Inflation targeting involves setting the current policy instrument at a level that
would make the expected value of inflation equal to the central bank’s inflation
target (Cukierman, 2001).
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This significant change in policy came from a shift in the idea that there was
a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment to the belief that there
is only a relationship between unexpected inflation and employment and output
(Schwartz et al., 2009). The latter relationship, called the expectations-augmented
Phillips curve, implied that if the central bank had an informational advantage
over the private sector, monetary policy could be used to smooth business cycle
fluctuations.
Despite the general consensus on the importance of stabilizing the price level,
central banks have different objectives mandated by their governing bodies. In
the Fed, The Board of Governors and the FOMC are required by the Federal Re-
serve Act to conduct policy condicive towards achieving the goals of maximum
employment, price stability and long-term interest rate stability, without a speci-
fied weight given to the different goals. Since the appointment of Paul Volcker in
1979, the Fed has appeared to have put most of its efforts into keeping inflation
low but positive. The BoE is required by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to meet
a symmetrical inflation target, in which inflation is currently measured by the CPI.
The Maastricht Treaty mandates that the primary objective of the ECB is price
stability in the eurozone, but gives no numerical targets for price stability or in-
flation. However, the ECB gives itself an inflation target as a part of its monetary
policy strategy. Meeting an established numberical objective gives helps the bank
anchor the expectations of market participants and provide accountability
The Fed does not have an official strategy, but appears to follow a simple
"Taylor rule" (Schwartz et al., 2009). If the Federal Funds rate is 1% or more
above/below 2% inflation or potential GNP, the Fed Funds rate is adjusted by 0.5
percentage-point steps. The Fed also uses open market operations and sets reserve
requirements to change inflation rate.
The BoE follows interest rate targeting, in which it changes the official Bank
Rate paid on commerical bank reserves to keep inflation near the rate required by
the Chancellor (currently 2%). The BoE also conducts purchases of private assets
to increase liquidity and boost nominal demand if the interest rate has fallen too
low to be decreased any more (Bank of England, 2012).
The ECB follows a strategy comprised of a quantative definition of price sta-
bility and analyzing the risks to price stability using both economic and monetary
analysis (European Central Bank, 2012). The Governing Council of the ECB
defines price stability as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Con-
sumer Prices (HICP) of less than 2% for the euro area. To affect the price level,
the ECB uses open market operations, standing facilities (which provide a floor
and ceiling for the overnight market interest rate) and sets the minimum reserve
requirements for credit institutions.
Publishing the specifics of what a central bank is required to do makes the
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central bank accountable to its governing body, and to the public. If the central
bank fails to meet a specific target, they are usually required to present reasons why
they did not meet that target and what they will do to improve their policy-making
within the next quarter or year. For example, if the BoE fails to keep inflation
within 1 percentage point above or below target, it must send an open letter to the
Chancellor explaining why inflation has deviated so much and state what the bank
will do about it (Schwartz et al., 2009). If these reports are unsatisfactory often
enough, presumably there were be negative consequences for the central bankers,
which will provide incentives for the central bank to perform to the best of its
abilities.
3.1.2 Policy Motives and Opinions
Just as important as what a central bank’s main goal is and the means by which
the central banker attempts to accomplish it are the reasons behind the central
banker’s policy decisions. The decisions are released in different formats, with
differing degrees of detail as to how and why a certain decision was made.
The Federal Reserve’s strategy is quite different from most other central banks,
as it keeps its staff projections secret but publishes its FOMC inflation forecasts for
the next three years quarterly. The full transcript of the meeting is not published,
but votes are attributed to each committee member so that the public is able to
see the degree of dissent on a decision. The Chairman of the Board reports to
Congress every three months when the Fed releases its forward-looking assessment
of future monetary policy. It is interesting to note that before 1994, the FOMC
did not publicly announce its target for the federal funds rate after the meeting
at which it was determined (Woodford, 2005). Markets could only try and guess
what the fed funds rate was by looking at the Fed’s open market operations.
The BoE publishes a report on inflation every quarter, after which it reports
to Parliament. It publishes the minutes, but not the full transcript of its Mon-
etary Policy Committee meetings, and also attributes the votes of its members.
Additionally, it relases summaries of its Financial Policy Committee meetings, an
annual report, a quarterly bulliten, and a bi-annual report on financial stability.
Between 1993 and 1996, the BoE released charts with a uniformly-shaded range
of uncertainty around the bank’s central projection of inflation. This type of chart
was abandoned because it encouraged the reader to focus on the central projection,
implied the bank’s inflation project was very precise, and gave no weight to the
discussion of risks to the forecasts (Britton et al., 1998). The BoE now uses the
fan chart which, according to the BoE, is a better tool for showing that "monetary
policy is about making decisions in an uncertain world." There are fan charts
for predictions of both GDP and the CPI. The following is a chart showing the
predicted percentage change in prices from a year earlier:
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Figure 1: Bank of England, Aug. 2012
The ECB publishes annual and weekly reports and a monthly bulliten. It
releases its forcasts, but the ECB explicitly says these numbers are projections and
not commitments to a certain policy action. It does not publish full transcripts or
minutes of its meetings, and does not publish a record of the individual votes in
its meetings. Instead of fan charts, the ECB releases staff projections of GDP and
HICP forecasts, which are given as an interval of values:
Figure 2: European Central Bank, May 2012
For brevity’s sake, the main focus in this paper is on only three central banks.
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However, one recent change in central bank policy in several smaller central banks
is of significant interest, especially in regards to increasing transparency of mone-
tary policy. The central banks of some countries including Norway, New Zealand,
Iceland and Sweden publish not only their estimates of the output gap, but also the
numbers underlying their macroeconomic forecasts (Blinder et al., 2008). Svens-
son (2006) says that announcing the central bank’s optimal projection and the
analysis behind the predicitions would be the most effective way to implement
monetary policy, as this allows the most precise and advanced evaluations of the
bank’s monetary policy and decisions.
While people well-versed in central bank behavior welcome the extra informa-
tion, there is a concern that these predictions will confuse the public, who may
not understand the conditional nature of the forecasts (Blinder et al., 2008). The
act of releasing these forecasts could also may complicate the banks’ decision mak-
ing processes. If the difference between a bank’s predictions and the policy the
bank ends up using is too large, that discrepancy may damage the central bank’s
credibility and induce economic agents to misallocate resources if their decisions
were based on the central bank’s forecasts. Since the step forward in transparency
is relatively young, more years of data will be needed to see if the increase in
information has a significant effect on financial markets and bank credibility.
3.1.3 Timing
As economic statistics are unavoidably imperfect measurements of sometimes im-
precise concepts, no central bank can gurantee that the information they release
to the public is one-hundred percent accurate. It is for this reason that central
banks are concerned that the benefits financial markets gain from knowing what
the central banks’ decisions are as soon as possible are outweighed by the dispro-
portionate impact of any error the quickly-released data would have on altering
future expectations (Morris & Shin, 2002). A main challenge for central banks is
to release information in a timely-enough manner to allow the private sector to
pursue its goals but not release it so quickly that errors in the data cause severe
problems.
Today, most central banks release their data and opinions to the public on the
day they are established. This is a recent and significant change. It was not until
1994 that the Federal Reserve started announcing changes in its target federal
funds rate on the day of its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings
(Blinder et al., 2008). Announcing policy decisions creates news, but making the
decisions public immediately eliminates any guessing by market participants, thus
increasing the signal-to-noise ratio.
Opinions differ as to what information should be released. The Fed and the
Bank of England publish both minutes and information on how each member of the
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committee voted in the meeting, while the ECB only publishes a press statement
with its policy decision. The minutes undergo an editing process that results in a
substantial time delay before the information is made public. The ECB holds press
conferences immediately after their meetings about policy decisions, which has the
advantage of sending information to market participants as soon as possible. The
opportunity for the public to ask questions during these announcement sessions
can help clarify any misunderstandings that are in the press release (Blinder et al.,
2008).
All major central banks today make decisions by committee. The most natu-
ral occasion for communication by a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) happens
on the days of meetings, which are when decisions are announced. The timing
and content of communciations about meetings differs substantially across central
banks. The Fed puts out a short press release containing the policy decision, a
short explanation of the motivation behind the decision, and occasionally predic-
tions about the economy in the near future. The Bank of England usually only
provides an explanation of its decisions when it does something unexpected or
when it changes interest rates. The ECB releases both a press statement that is
less detalied than those of the Fed and the Bank of England, and holds a press
conference on the day of Governing Council meetings. The ECB does not realease
minutes of the meetings, while the other two banks do; however, the ECB’s press
conference has the advantage putting out information sooner, as the minutes for
the Fed and the Bank of England are not published immediately after MPC meet-
ings.
All of these central banks are legally required to provide an annual report and
appear before its legislature. The ECB publishes the Monthly Bulletin, which
asses economic development and provides information pertaining to the analytical
framework used in its decision-making process. The Bank of England publishes its
quarterly Inflation Report, which provides a "comprehensive and forward-looking
framework for discussion" among its MPC members to facilitate decision mak-
ing and explain the MCP’s decisions, along with the Quarterly Bulletin, which
comments on current market events and monetary policy operations. The Fed
publishes a semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, which comments
on the basic state of the economy and the Fed’s predictions.
3.2 Effects of Transparency
Proponents of transparency give both economic and moral reasons for increasing
the amount of information available to the public. The ECB states that trans-
parency not only helps the public understand its monetary policy, it is crucial for
the credibility, self-dicipline and predictibility of the central bank. Additionally,
varying degrees of transparency will affect the public’s expectations of inflation and
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employment. When a central bank operates with limited transparency it keeps in-
formation about shocks private at the time inflationary expectations are informed
and put into wage contracts. With full transparency, the information about the
shocks is released to the public before expectations are formed (Cukierman, 2001).
Usually, transparency in financial matters is seen as beneficial for the welfare
of the general public. There is evidence that when the central bank has private
information about its own shifting objectives, greater transparency reagarding
its objectives leads to higher social welfare (Cukierman, 2001). However, several
papers show that the instinct to assume that greater transparency always results
in better outcomes for society should be examined in greater detail. Some models
of transparency have come to the conclusion that full transparency is not always
best for society in every aspect (Jensen, 2002). Though complete transparency
may be necessary politically, such a policy may not be optimal from an economic
point of view.
James and Lawler’s (2010) model (discussed in Section 5) supports the hy-
pothesis that changing the degree of transparency of the central bank will affect
the unemployment rate and the price level, and possibly be detrimental to public
welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) argue that when agents have no private, socially
valuable information, greater transparency always increases the public’s welfare.
When agents also have access to private and independent sources of information,
increasing the amount of information available to the public may be harmful in
some cases. Jensen (2002) finds that the welfare effects of increased transparency
depend on the reputation of the central bank, and the current state of the econ-
omy. Greater transparency leads to a more consistent central bank, but this may
be detrimental to economic stabilization during shocks. Cukierman (2001) finds
that, when central banks have more than one objective, expected social welfare is
higher with limited transparency than with full transparency.
3.3 Higher-Order Beliefs
Differing methods of releasing information affect not only the public directly but
also decisions made by both the bank and the public in an indirect manner. These
indirect effects may be just as important to financial markets and monetary policy
effectiveness as are the direct effects. This hypothesis has led to an increased in-
terest in how higher-order beliefs affect central banking. Taking into account what
agent A thinks agent B believes, based on agent B’s actions (called agent A higher-
order beliefs), agent A may respond differently to new information compared to
how agent A would respond if they only considered their own expectations (agent
A’s first-order beliefs).
It has been proposed that higher-order beliefs are not as quick to change in
response to greater transparency as are first-order beliefs. This delay leads to
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temporary real effects of nominal changes in the money supply (Woodford, 2003)
(Angeletos & La’O, 2004). Though information on the money supply may be
readily available to those who search for it, many people will not know to do so,
or will ignore current facts in favor of internalized biases. The value of the current
money supply is usually published within a month after it has been established, but
the effects of monetary disturbances have been shown to linger for several quarters
after the information’s release (Woodford, 2003). Woodford (2001) attributes this
lack of adjustment to the inaccuracy of peoples’ subjective perceptions, rather
than to errors in the data.
Angeletos and La’O (2009) reason that if not all firms have full information
about an economic shock, at the time the shocks occurs, the fully-informed firms
will adjust their prices only partly. as other firms with less complete information
will not respond to the shock with a full price adjustment. Of course, how much all
of these firms’ prices affect one another. The degree of strategic complementarity
has a large effect on the adjustment rate of expectations. If decisions by different
economic agents are strategic complements, then higher-order expectations will
adjust more slowly than if there is a small degree of strategic complementarity
(Woodford, 2003).
The importance of higher-order beliefs to central bank communication is related
to central bank’s credibility problem and past accuracy in forecasting economic
shocks. If the central bank has a history of being extremely good at predicting
what will happen in the econonmy, the private sector will most likely believe that
the central bank’s statements about changes in the economic climate and will follow
the central bank’s lead in regards to employment contracts and wages. However, if
the private sector believes the bank’s belief about the future state of the economy
is inaccurate, they will follow their own private research, and monetary policy will
not be effective. It becomes difficult very quickly to ascertain the effects of higher-
order beliefs, but is worth looking at second-order beliefs at least, especially as
both private firms and central banks come up with more extenstive reports and
forecasts.
4 Modeling the Effects of Transparency with Ho-
mogeneous Private Information
The following model was constructed by James and Lawler in order to examine the
effects of increasing the transparency of central banks on wage and unemployment
levels. They assume that the economy’s output is produced by monopolistically
competitive firms that share a Cobb-Douglas production technology. All of the
variables (except inflation) are in logarithmic form unless otherwise noted, and all
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parameters are constrained to be positive. Labor is the only variable input.
The relationship between firm i’s output, ysi , and employment, li, is described
by
ysi = αli + θ, 0 < α < 1, (1)
where θ ∼ N(0,σ2θ). The demand for firm i’s output, yi, as a proportion of aggregate
demand, y, is determined by firm i’s price, pi, relative to the aggregate price level,
p:
yi − y = −ε(pi − p) (2)
where
y =
∫ 1
i=0
yidi, and p =
∫ 1
i=0
pidi
The parameter ε represents the relative price elasticity of product demand and
shows the degree of competition within the goods market; under perfect competi-
tion we would have ε→∞. The parameter z measures the elasticity of substitution
between goods. Aggregate demand is determined by the real money stock, or the
nominal money supply, m, deflated by the price level
y = φ(m− p) (3)
where φ is the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to real balances. Com-
bining (2) and (3), we obtain firm i’s product demand:
yi = φ(m− p)− ε(pi − p). (4)
Product prices are set by the firm onces wages have been determined and after
both the firm’s realization of θ and the central bank’s choice of m. Firm i’s profit
function is
Πi = PiYi −WiLi, (5)
where the upper case letters denote the non-log levels of the variables. Combining
(1) and (4) with (5) and maximizing Πi by Pi gives us:
Pi =
[
Wαi (Y P
ε)(1−α)e−θ
] 1
[α+ε(1−α)] . (6)
Taking logs of (6) and using (2) and (3) gives us the associated product demand
yi. We combine this expression for yi with (1) to obtain firm i’s profit maximizing
demand for labor:
ldi =
φ(m− p)− ε(wi − p) + (ε− 1)θ
α + ε(1− α) , (7)
where wi is the nominal wage.
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Each firm has an immobilie pool of workers who are represented by a firm-
specific union. This union has monopoly power over wage-setting within that firm.
The desired supply of labor by union i members, lsi , is assumed to be completely
inelastic with its value normalized at one for convience:
lsi = 1. (8)
Therefore, lsi is interpreted as the market-clearing level of employment within the
respective individual labor market. Nominal wages are determined at the begin-
ning of each period and are negotiated for single-period contracts. Employment
demand is also determined within that same period. Union i sets its nominal wage,
wi, to minimize the expected value of its loss function:
Lui = (wi − p)2 + γl2i . (9)
This particular equation form for specifying a union’s objectives is standard in
literature about economy-wide consequences of union wage setting (Herrendorf &
Lockwood, 1997), (Hutchinson & Walsh, 1998). The quadratic form implies that
fluctuations in employment and the real wage around their target values are unde-
sirable. The parameter γ represents the relative weight each union places attaches
to the employment objective before setting its nominal wage and determines the
impact of any anticipated supply shocks on employment and the real wage. Equa-
tion (9) implies that the target values of both employment and the real wage are
consistent with expected labor market clearing. Therefore, we assume that unions
will not try and raise the real wage above its expected market-clearing value. If
they did raise the real wage, the unemployment rate would increase, as would the
inflation rate.
Wage determination occurs before implementation of monetary policy and prior
to unions observing the actual value of the supply shock. Immediately before
setting their nominal wages, all unions receive a noisy signal, s, of that shock:
s = θ + u, u ∼ N(0, σ2u) (10)
where u is the realization of a noise term drawn from a zero-mean normal distri-
bution with variance σ2u. Each union’s expectation of θ, E(θ), is given by:
E(θ|s) = βs, β = σ2θ/(σ2θ + σ2u). (11)
We interpret s to be information provided to wage setters by the central bank. If
the quality of information supplied by the central bank increases, the variance of
s will decrease so that the signal to the unions becomes more precise as to the
exact nature of the shock. As the signal becomes more precise, β will be larger
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and unions will attach more weight to the central bank’s signal when forming
expectations.
The central bank is assumed to follow a monetary policy aimed at minimizing
a conventionally-specified social loss function:
Ls = pi2 + λl2, l =
∫ 1
0
lidi. (12)
In Equation (12), the social loss increases when inflation, pi, moves from its socially-
optimal value of zero and when aggregate employment, l, moves from its socially-
efficient level, which is assumed to be the labor-market clearing level in individual
markets. λ represents the relative weight placed on employment stabilization by
the central bank when implementing monetary policy. We assume that the central
bank’s objective function is public knowledge which removes any reputational con-
siderations that might arise without that information. The events we have listed
so far occur in the following order:
1. The supply shock θ is realized.
2. The central bank observes θ and the provides a noisy signal s to the private
sector.
3. The unions determine wages wi.
4. The money supply m is set by the central bank.
5. The private sector observes θ; pi, p, l and y are determined.
In the above sequence, there are two main features to which we should to pay
special attention. First, we assume that monetary policy is implemented after
wages have been set. This is a common depiction of monetary policy and wage
determination in the literature, and not unreasonable, as intuitively monetary
policy is more flexible than wage contracts.
Second, the central bank has a significant informational advantage in that they
realize the true value of φ much earlier than does the private sector. James and
Lawler justify this asymmetry by claiming that central banks devote greater re-
sources to forecasting and data-collecting than do private firms, resulting in better
predictions of economic disturbances. In practice, the existence of central banks’
informational advantage seems to exist, at least in the United States. The Fed has
access to data unavailable to the general public and their inflation estimates are
preferable to those of market participants (Romer & Romer, 2000).
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4.1 Equilibrium
In order to find the macroeconomic equilibrium we first have to determine the
price level as a function of the nominal money stock, the average nominal wage,
w, and θ. If employment is demand-determined, substituting (7) into (1) and then
aggregating over firms gives us an expression for aggregate output:
y = α
[
φ(m− p)− (w − p)
α + (1− α)
]
+ θ. (13)
By setting (13) equal to the aggregate demand equation (3), we are able to deter-
mine p:
p =
αw + φ(1− α)m− θ
[α + φ(1− α)] . (14)
The associated expression for aggregate employment is found by setting (3) equal
to (1). Substituting in p and aggregating across firms gives us:
φm− φ
[
αw + φ(1− α)m− θ
α + φ(1− α)
]
= αl + θ. (15)
Solving for l and simplifying gives us the expression for aggregate employment:
l =
φm− φw + (1− φ)θ
[α + φ(1− α)] . (16)
We can now consider the monetary policy decision of the central bank. We
choose an m that minimizes the central bank’s social loss function, Equation (12),
subject to (14) and (16). We set p−1 = 0 for convenience, which implies pi = p, so
that we have:
Ls = p2 + λl2. (17)
Substituting in the expressions for aggregate price level and aggregate employment
gives us:
Ls =
[
αw + φ(1− α)m− θ
α + φ(1− α)
]2
+ λ
[
φm− φw + (1− φ)θ
α + φ(1− α)
]2
. (18)
Then we take the partial derivative of 18 with respect to m and set the resulting
expressionequal to zero. After simplifying, we end up with the solution to the
central bank’s optimization problem:
m =
[φ− α(1− α)]w + [λ(1− φ) + (1− α)]θ
φ[λ+ (1− α)2] . (19)
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Combining (19) with (14 )and (16) determines the price level and aggregate em-
ployment as functions of the average nominal wage and a supply shock. The
average nominal wage represents the aggregate outcome of individual union wage
setting decisions.
Taking the nominal wages of all other unions as given, union i chooses the
nominal wage that will minimize the expected value of (9), subject to the expecta-
tion of the productivity shock that is identified in (11). Each union is aware of the
objective function of the central bank, and is therefore able to infer its monetary
policy reaction to non-zero realizations of θ. However, as an individual union is a
tiny part of the whole economy, the union perceives itself as having no influence
on the setting of m. After substituting (7) into (9) and minimizing with respect
to wi, we can use (14) and (19) to obtain union i’s first order condition:
wi =
1
{γε2[α + ε(1− α)]2}[λ+ (1− α)2]{
λγε2 + λ[α + ε(1− α)]2 − γαε(1− α)}w
+ [α + ε(1− α)]{γε(1− α)− λ[α + ε(1− α)]}βs. (20)
Setting wi = w yields the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium value of w:
w =
{γε(1− α)− λ[α + ε(1− α)]}βs
(1− α){γε+ (1− α)[α + ε(1− α)]} . (21)
Equation (21) shows that the expectation of a supply shock could cause unions
to either increase or decrease their nominal wage. This is because any change
in E(θ|s) = βs results from a change in θ observed by the central bank. The
central bank may then change λ in response to the shock, leading to an ambiguous
relationship between s and w. The factors determining the wage response to the
expectation of a non-zero θ are central to the welfare implications of the quality
of information provided by the central bank to wage setters.
The value of p resulting from the interaction between union wage setting and
monetary policy can be found using (21) and (19) with (14):
p = − λ[α + ε(1− α)]βs
(1− α){γε+ (1− α)[α + ε(1− α)]} −
λ(θ − βs)
[λ+ (1− α)2] . (22)
The same union and monetary policy interaction gives the following value of l,
which comes from substituting (21) and (19) into (16):
l =
λ[α + ε(1− α)]βs
{γε+ (1− α)[α + ε(1− α)]} +
(1− α)(θ − βs)
[λ+ (1− α)2] . (23)
Equations (22) and (23) show that changes in the price level and employment
are comprised of two elements. The first element comes from the interaction
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between monetary policy and the wage-setting decisions of unions in response to
the their expectation of θ. The second element shows the central bank’s optimal
policy reaction to the unions’ expectation errors.
The first term in (22) is refered to as the stochastic inflation bias:
− λ[α + ε(1− α)]βs
(1− α){γε+ (1− α)[α + ε(1− α)]}
This is a result of the central bank’s desire to achieve greater employment stability
from the wage determination process, assuming E(θ) 6= 0. Once wages have been
set with this expectation of θ, the central bank has an incentive to adjust monetary
policy in order to obtain its own optimal trade-off between price and employment
stability. However, the unions are aware of this incentive, and so when making
their wage decisions they incorporate the central bank’s anticipated attempts at
decreasing unemployment into their choice of nominal wages.
If the central bank reacts to each supply shock without considering the long
term implications of its policy decisions, the unions’ response to the anticipated
supply shocks creaters greater price volatility compared to a situation in which
the central bank credibly precommits to an optimal policy rule. In addition to
greater price level volatility, there is no reduction in employment variability if the
central bank does not stick to a pre-announced monetary policy. This is because
it is impossible for the central bank to use "surprise" changes in the money supply
to reduce unemployment.
If the central bank changes the money supply after wage contracts are drawn
up, for several subsequent periods the central bank will have drastically reduced
credibilty. The unions would then increase their wage demands in anticipation
of unannounced central bank policy decisions, which would lead to an ugly cycle
of ever increasing inflation. This would, of course, not improve productivity or
the unemployment rate and is a major reason central banks today publish details
of their policy plans and attempt to commit to certain courses of action. The
exact impact a predicted supply shock will have on the economy depends on the
extent to which is it predicted by the private sector, and therefore on the quality
of information provided to the public by the central bank.
4.2 Welfare Effects
As better informed agents are more able to make decisions which benefit them-
selves, any improvement in the quality of information concerning supply shocks
will be beneficial to the private sector.
After aggregating across unions and firms, we can find the expected union loss
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by substituting (23) into equation (9):
L = (w − p)2 + γ
[
λ[α + ε(1− α)]βs
{γε+ (1− α)[α + ε(1− α)]} +
(1− α)(θ − βs)
[λ+ (1− α)2]
]2
. (24)
Substituting (21) and (22) for (w − p) in (24) and differentiating with respect to
σ2u gives us:
dE(Lu)
dσ2u
=
{γε(1− α)− λ[α + ε(1− α)]}
{γε+ (1− α)[α + ε(1− α)]}2[λ+ (1− α)2]2A1, (25)
where
A1 =
[{γε(1− α)− λ[α + ε(1− α)]}[γ + (1− α)2] + 2α[λ+ (1− α)2]] β2.
Since the right hand side of (25) is ambiguous in sign, it is possible that an im-
provement in signal quality could increase the expected loss among unions. In
other words, we want to see if unions would have a greater loss when s becomes
closer in value to θ. Proposition 1 describes the conditions under which such a
situation could arise:
Proposition 1. An improvement in the precision of the signal, s, of the supply
shock, θ, as represented by a reduction in the variance of the signal noise, σ2u, will
increase the expected union loss if and only if
α
ε(1− α)
{
1− 2γ[λ+ (1− α)
2]
λ[γ + (1− α)2]
}
<
γ − λ
λ
<
α
ε(1− α) . (26)
We are also interested in the relationship between signal precision and the
expected social loss so we substitute (22) and (23) into the central bank’s social
loss function, (12). Taking expectations and differentiating with respect to σ2u
gives us:
dE(Ls)
dσ2u
=
λ{γε(1− α)− λ[α + ε(1− α)]}
(1− α)2{γε+ (1− α)[α + ε(1− α)]}2[λ+ (1− α)2]A2, (27)
where
A2 =
{
γε(1− α) + [λ+ 2(1− α)2][α + ε(1− α)]} β2.
Equation (27) directly implies:
Proposition 2. An improvement in the quality of information relating to the
supply shock provided by the central bank to unions will increase the expected social
loss if and only if:
γ − λ
λ
<
α
ε(1− α) . (28)
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In other words, if γ decreases enough or if λ increases enough, the left hand
side of the inequality decreases. Assuming the preferences attached to employment
stability by both the unions (γ) and the central bank (λ) do not have a significant
and direct effects on the degrees of economy of scale (α) and the relative price
elasticity of product demand (ε), if the central bank places a much greater em-
phasis on employment stability compared to the emphasis unions place on their
employment objective, an increase in the quality of information released to the
public will result in an increase in the expected social loss.
Therefore, there are theoretically situations in which improved central bank
transparency can be detrimental to social welfare. Because of the monotonic nature
of the relationship between E(Ls) and σ2u represented by (27), if the inequality
identified by Proposition 2 is satisfied, zero disclosure will be optimal. However,
there may also be instances where greater transparency would give rise to a smaller
expected social loss, in which case full disclosure is optimal. We look at these
possible situations more closely in the next section.
4.3 Interpretation and discussion
The surprising result that there are, in fact, some situations in which increased
transparency results in reduced social welfare comes from two distinct forces, both
of which increase in strength as the signal provided by the central bank to unions
improves in quality. The first is associated with the relationship between the
relative weights placed by unions and the central bank on employment stability
compared to price level stability and the subsequent interaction between monetary
policy and wage determination. This force has ambiguous effects in regards to how
greater central bank transparency affects social welfare but is always beneficial for
unions. The second force comes from an externality which characterizes wage de-
termination and is always detrimental to both society and unions. Because its
consequences would be fully internalized by a single, economy-wide union, its ad-
verse impact originates from uncoordinated wage setting. The detrimental impact
of the second force decreases as the product market becomes more competitive.
James and Lawler’s model shows that, to make sure an increase in transparency
will be beneficial to society, unions must have an incentive to value employment
stability more than the central bank does. In fact, if unions only care about
employment, full transparency will be the most beneficial situation and will allow
complete stabilization of both employment and price levels.
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4.3.1 The consequences of transparency with a perfectly competitive
goods market
By considering the limiting case of a perfectly competitive goods market (ε→∞),
we can eliminate the influence of the externality caused by uncoordinated wage
setting and focus on the relationship between the central bank and the unions. It
is clear that the condition in Proposition 1 will never be satisfied since it reduces
to
0 <
γ − λ
λ
< 0
when the goods market operates under perfect competition. If the goods market is
perfectly competitive, an improvement in signal quality can never be detrimental
from the unions’ point of view.
There are three situations which may arise under perfect competition in Propo-
sition 2: γ = λ, γ < λ, and γ > λ.
1) γ = λ: Suppose that γ = λ and that wage setters are completely uninformed
about the true value or occurance of θ. If the nominal wage remains constant,
movements in the price level as the central bank responds to supply shocks will be
exactly the same as movements in the real wage. Therefore, when the central bank
and the unions both place the same weight on employment stability, the imple-
mentation of monetary policy will achieve each union’s desired trade-off between
real wage and employment stability. This symmetry comes about as a by-product
of achieving society’s optimal trade-off between price level and employment. Each
union is aware that if they place the same weight on employment stability as the
central bank does, when the central bank implements monetary policy the union’s
desired real-wage-employment-stability trade-off will occur. The optimal response
of unions to any signal of a supply shock is to keep the nominal wage constant. In
this case, macroeconomic outcomes and the resulting expected values of both the
social and union loss functions are independent of signal quality.
2) γ < λ: When γ < λ, the monetary policy implemented by the central
bank creates too much employment stability at the expense of excessive real wage
variability in the unions’ point of view. Any signal concerning a non-zero θ will
motivate the unions to change the nominal wage as they try to to achieve their
desired trade-off between employment and wage stability. While the movement in
the nominal wage is beneficial for the unions, increased transparency is detrimen-
tal to social welfare, as it increases the variability of both the employment level
and the price level. Frequent variations in optimal wage and employment levels
impose costs on society in general, as it is expensive for businesses to be constantly
adjusting prices and wage contracts.
In the extreme case where γ = 0, unions are only concerned with stabilizing the
real wage. This leads to an absence of any real wage adjustment to counteract the
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supply shock’s impact. In this situation, θ has its maximum effect on employment
and, through the subsequent policy response by the central bank, the price level.
3) γ > λ: When unions place a greater relative value on employment stability
compared to the central bank, greater central bank transparency is beneficial to
society. If the nominal wage is constant and γ > λ, the outcome of stabilization
policy results in too little real wage adjustment and too high a degree of em-
ployment variability for the unions’ liking. Therefore, any information concering
the realization of supply shocks will lead to a nominal wage response directed at
attaining greater employment stability. This benefits both the unions and the
general public, as society gains from the reduction in employment volatility and
from the fall in stochastic inflation bias. As γ →∞, union concerns move soley to-
wards employment and full transparency will allow complete stabilization of both
employment and prices.
4.3.2 Union wage setting with monopolistic competition
Up until now, we have only analyzed the consequences of central bank transparency
when the goods market is perfectly competitive. When the market is characterized
instead by monopolistic competition, an externality present in union wage setting
comes into play. It arises because each union regards its influence on the price
level, and hence on aggregate demand, as negligible.
The perceived trade-off between employment and the real wage at the indi-
vidual union level differs from that which actually prevails at the aggregate level.
Following the observation of any signal indicating a supply shock, the aggregate
adjustment of the nominal wage departs from the efficient response. Unions change
their level of employment too much while adjusting the real wage too little.
It is easiest to see that the unions’ collective response is inefficient we let γ = λ.
If unions are initially uninformed about the true nature of θ, stabilization policy
achieves the optimal outcome in response to shocks from the perspectives of both
unions and the general public. When unions, as a group, believe their actions have
no impact on the price level, the economic equilibrium is no longer independent of
whether a signal is provided to unions. Any information relating to θ now leads to
unions increasing the nominal wage. This happens because each union is trying to
improve on the outcome associated with an unchanged nominal wage. They think
that an increase in the real wage for their small number of workers (compared
to the total number of workers in the economy-wide labor force) will not affect
the wages of workers in other unions and certainly will not affect the price level.
Therefore, any signal released by the central bank of an economic shock creates
a movement away from the efficient equilibrium. There is a larger-than-optimal
adjustment in employment and the magnitude of the adjustment increases as the
signal’s precision increases. Greater transparency is associated with more volatile
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employment and will result in higher than expected losses for both unions and
society.
The inefficient adjustments of the price level and employment can also occur
when γ 6= λ. The negative impact on social welfare arising from the wage setting
externality increases when γ < λ. A smaller relative weight placed on employment
stability by unions means greater variability in employment and a larger stochastic
inflation bias as unions become better informed. Greater signal precision will
enhance social welfare only if γ exceeds λ by some margin. From Proposition 2,
quality of information provided by the central bank improves social welfare if and
only if the weight placed on employment stability by unions is:
γ <
λ[α + ε(1− α)]
ε(1− α) . (29)
If the two sides in equation 29 were equal, the larger relative weight placed on
employment by unions would be just enough to compensate for the effects of the
wage setting externality on employment variability. However, for all γ less than
this minimum value, we end up with dE(Ls)/dσ2u < 0.
5 Heterogeneous Private Beliefs
5.1 Heterogeneous private information and central bank dis-
closure
A logical next step in the evaluation of the utility of central bank information is to
examine what happens to employment and price levels when unions have differing
private information sets. As each firm in any large economy has different research
capabilities and priorities it is more realistic to assume each one recieves a slightly
different view of the economic shock, or a different s. While all firms receive
the same signal from the central bank, each one may have their own economic
forecasters who can give additional useful information or could be in an industry
that is a good predictor of future changes in supply.
A key factor in generating Propositions 1 and 2 is the externality arising from
uncoordinated wage decisions of individual unions. This externality would be at
its strongest if each union knew with certainty the realized value of any shock prior
to setting its nominal wage. Incorporating union-specific signals relating to the
value of θ into our analysis would introduce an additional externality, intrinsic to
the information process but confined to situations of imperfect knowledge.
The uncoordinated-wage-decision externality arises as a result of agents’ ac-
tions being strategic complements. If each union, before making its wage decision,
observes its own private signal in addition to any information provided by the
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central bank, the information content of the public and private signals will be
exploited inefficiently. Distortions other than incomplete information create a gap
between the complete-information equilibrium and the first best equilibrium, lead-
ing to a decrease in welfare with both private and public information. A reduction
in noise (or smaller variances for the public and private signals) brings equilibrium
activity closer to its complete-information equilibrium but moves it away from the
first-best level (Angeletos & Pavan, 2007).
The consequences of this inefficiency will, in most cases, lead to a situation in
which greater transparency is undesirable. Any information about θ disclosed by
the central bank will limit the effectiveness of policy intervention aimed at reducing
the frequency and magnitude of employment fluctuations. The concurrent induced
wage responses of individual unions will only partially compensate for the reduced
effectiveness of monetary policy.
If the central bank realizes the true value of θ before releasing any informa-
tion and implementing its policy setting, these results regarding the desirability
of transparency remain the same. When agents have access to perfect informa-
tion, any sources of imperfect information will be ignored. Therefore, when full
transparency is optimal in the absence of heterogenous private information, full
transparency will still be optimal even when unions observe their own signals re-
garding the supply shock, as the private signals will be redundant. In the "border-
line" case examined previously, where the social loss is independent of the degree
of transparency, unions will still anticipate that the central bank will achieve the
unions’ desired trade-off between employment stability and the real wage level.
There would be no reason to change the nominal wage in response to informa-
tion received about θ, no matter its source. Because the informational externality
associated with heterogeneous private information tends to exacerabate the detri-
mental effects arising from central bank transparency, it follows that, in cases
where zero disclosure is optimal in the absence of private union signals, the exis-
tence of private signals that the unions pay attention to will inevitably increase
the likelihood against full central bank disclosure being the optimal situation.
The potentially harmful consequences of central bank transparency, in combi-
nation with private heterogenous information, become more significant when the
central bank itself is imperfectly informed about the true nature of θ. When the
central bank is not operating under perfect information, each union will adjust its
nominal wage in response to its private signal, even if the central bank releases
all of its own information immediately. As complete transparency does not im-
part perfect knowledge of the value of the supply shock, the inefficiency stemming
from the use of available information will strengthen the detrimental effects caused
by increased transparency. Therefore, union-specific signals relating to the sup-
ply shock will extend the range of parameter value combinations for which zero
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disclosure is socially optimal. For the cases in which our analysis has identified
full transparency to be optimal, heterogeneous private information introduces an
optimal strategy not present in our framework, that of an intermediate degree of
transparency. Though this can occur only for certain parameter value combina-
tions, it is consistent with several analyses of central bank disclosure discussed in
previous sections.
5.2 Modeling Idiosyncratic Shocks
In order to see how heterogeneous information affects wage, price and employment
levels, we examine a two-stage model which is essentially a synthesis of the model
previously discussed by James and Lawler and a model developed by Angeletos
and La’O (2009). Instead of basing their predictions about aggregate economic
activty on uniform information, firms and unions are located in separate sectors,
or "islands".
Each island is subject to technology shocks, which have both an aggregate
and an idiosyncratic component. It is assumed that local (i.e. sector-specific)
productivity is distributed log-normally in the cross section of islands and that
firms and unions know the economic fundamentals of their own sector perfectly.
From this information, local agents can obtain a basic idea about the state of the
economy as a whole while not knowing exactly how much the aggregate economy
is expanding or contracting.
The central bank is perfectly informed about both the levels of employment
and inflation in the islands and about the state of the overall economy. In order to
manipulate the economy’s price and employment levels to meet its own objectives,
the central bank releases information about economic disturbances to the public.
5.2.1 Setup
There is a representative household which supplies workers to all the labor unions
in the economy. There is a continuum of islands (which can be thought of as the
different sectors in the economy) indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], each inhabited by a rep-
resentative firm which produces a differentiated good or commodity. Information
is symmetric within an island, but is asymmetric between islands. Each firm has
an immobile pool of workers, represented by an individual firm-specific union that
supplies the labor to that firm. Firms and unions in the same sector are operating
under perfect competition with each other, rather under monopolistic competition
as in James & Lawler’s model.
There are 2 stages. During Stage 1, the household sends a worker to the unions
on each of the islands. Unions and firms have perfect information about local pro-
ductivity but imperfect and dispersed information about aggregate productivity.
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Local labor markets open and employment and production choices take place so
that local labor markets clear.
Once employment and production choices are sunk, workers return to their
households and the economy moves to the next stage. In Stage 2, all informa-
tion that was previously dispersed becomes common knowledge and commodity
markets open. Quantities are pre-determined by the exogenous productivities and
employment choices made during Stage 1, but prices adjust to clear product mar-
kets.
The utility function of the household is given by
u = χ
[
U(C)−
∫
Γ(Li)di
]
i. (30)
Li is the labor of the worker who is located on island i during Stage 1 and C is a
composite of all commodities that the household purchases and consumes during
Stage 2. C is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator function:
C =
[∫
c
z−1
z
i di
] z
z−1
,
where z is the elasticity of substitution across different goods. This CES structure
is stated in order to generate a situation in which the decision of island i is trans-
mitted to the aggregate economy. The household essentially "outsources" labor to
the unions and has slightly different objectives compared to the unions.
Union i’s loss function is
Lui = (wi − p)2 + γl2i , (31)
the same as it was in James & Lawler’s model.
The output of the representative firm on island i is given by
Qi = Ai(Li)
α,
or in logarithmic form,
qi = αli + ai, (32)
where 0 < α < 1. This is the same as the output function in Equation (1), where
the uniform shock θ is now the idiosyncratic shock ai. The firm’s realized profits
are given by
Πt = PiQi −WiLi. (33)
It is assumed that households own equal shares of all firms in the economy. The
firm’s objective is to maximize expected shareholder value, which is U
′(C)
P
Πi.
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Although workers cannot move across islands within a period, commodities are
traded beyond the islands’ geographical boundaries. The clearing conditions for
product markets are given by
ci = Qi∀i
such that
ai ≡ logAi = a¯+ ξi,
where a¯ is the common component drawn by nature and ξi ∼ N(0, 1/κξ) is the
idiosyncratic component. Although unions and firms don’t know the exact value
of the shock, it is common knowledge that a¯ is log-normally distributed with mean
µ and variance 1/κ0:
a¯ = µ+ ,  ∼ N(0, 1/κ0). (34)
Only the central bank knows the exact value of a¯ before wages are determined.
Agents see the signals xi and yi, which they know are distributed:
xi = a¯+ ui and yi = a¯+ η
with
ui ∼ N(0, 1/κx) and η ∼ N(0, 1/κy).
Firm i finds its conditional expectation of a¯ given the other signals it observes, by
calculating the conditional expectation of a¯:
Ei[a¯|µ, 1/κ0, ai, xi, yi].
If we let xi = µ+ + ui we can see that ai and xi are correlated:
E[(a¯− µ)(xi − µ)] = E[a¯xi − a¯µ− xiµ+ µ2]
= E[(µ+ )(µ+ ui + )− (µ+ )µ− µ(µ+ ui + ) + µ2]
= E[ui] + E[
2]
= 1/κ0.
The individual signal xi can be rewritten to contain all of the information in both
a¯ and yi:
xi = µ+ + ui + η, (35)
so that xi ∼ N(µ, 1/κ0 + 1/κx + 1/κy). Denote
A =
[
a¯
xi
]
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which is multivariate normal with expected value EA = [µ µ]′ and covariance
matrix
Σ =E(A− EA)(A− EA)′
= E
[
(a¯− µ) (a¯− µ)(xi − µ)
(xi − µ)(a¯− µ) (xi − µ)2
]
= E
[
2 (+ ui + η)
(+ ui + η) (+ ui + η)
2
]
=
[ 1
κ0
1
κ0
1
κ0
( 1
κ0
+ 1
κx
+ 1
κy
).
]
The conditional expectation E(a¯|µ = xi) is given by:
E(a¯|µ = xi) = µ+ Σ12Σ−122 (xi − µ)
= µ+
1
κ0
(
1
κ0
+
1
κx
+
1
κy
)−1
[xi − µ]
= µ+
(
κxκy + κ0κy + κ0κx
κ0(κ0 + κx + κy)
)
[xi − µ]
=
κ0
κ0 + κx + κy
µ+
κx
κ0 + κx + κy
xi +
κy
κ0 + κx + κy
xi
+
κxκy
κ0(κ0 + κx + κy)
[xi − µ]
The expected value of xi is µ, so the term with [xi−µ] becomes zero. Let yi to be
equal to µ+ + ui + η, which is the same way we defined xi in equation 35. This
means we can substitute yi for xi in the term with κy as the numerator. Finally,
we end up with sector i’s conditional expectation of aggregate productivity:
Eia¯ =
κ0
κ0 + κx + κy
µ+
κx
κ0 + κx + κy
xi +
κy
κ0 + κx + κy
yi. (36)
In order to see how ξi, the idiosyncratic component of ai, is included in xi, write
xi as:
xi =
κξ
κξ + κζ
ai +
κζ
κξ + κζ
x¯i, (37)
where x¯i = a¯+ζi is some other private signal observed by sector i with ζi ∼N(0, 1/κζ).
If we let
xi = a¯+ ξi + ui + ζi,
A = [ai xi]
′,
EA = [a¯ a¯]′,
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the corresponding covariance matrix is:
Σ =
[ 1
κξ
1
κξ
1
κξ
(
1
κξ+κζ
)] .
Then it is easy to see how ξi is included in xi:
xi =
κξ
κξ + κζ
(a+ ξi) +
κζ
κξ + κζ
(a+ ζi)
= a+
(
κξ
κξ + κζ
ξi +
κζ
κξ + κζ
ζi
)
= a+ ui,
where ui =
κξ
κξ+κζ
ξi +
κζ
κξ+κζ
ζi. This implies that ui ∼ N(0, 1/κx) with κx = κξ +κζ .
5.2.2 Finding the Equilibrium
The information set, or "type," of any island i is denoted by ωi, where
ωi = (ai, xi, yi).
The aggregate state of the economy is given by the cross-sectional distribution of
ωi, denoted by Ω.
Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of an employment strategy L(ω), a pro-
duction strategy Qω, a wage function W (ω), an aggregate output function QΩ,
an aggregate employment function LΩ, a price function Pω,Ω and a consumption
strategy c(P,Q) such that the following are true:
1. The aggregate price is normalized so that
PΩ ≡
[∫ 1
0
P 1−zω,Ω dF (ω|Ω)
] 1
1−z
= 1, ∀ Ωt
2. The quantity c(P,Q) is the household’s optimal demand for any commodity
whose price is P and aggregate output is Q.
3. The quantities L(ω) and Qω are optimal from the perspective of the repre-
sentative firm on island ω, where Qω = A(ω)L(ω)α
4. The local wage W (ω) minimizes union ω’s expected loss on island ω.
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5. When the aggregate economy’s state is Ω, the price that clears the market
for the good from island ω is Pω,Ω, and the aggregate output and employment
indices are, respectively,
QΩ =
[∫ 1
0
Q
z−1
z
ω dF (ω|Ω)
] z
z−1
and L(Ω) =
∫ 1
0
L(ω)dF (ω|Ω)
The first condition means that the numeraire for the economy is the CES com-
posite C. The rest of the condtions represent a hybrid of a Walrasian equilibrium
for the complete-information exchange economy that occurs duing Stage 2 once
production choices are fixed, and a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the incomplete-
information game played among different islands in Stage 1.
To solve for the equilibrium, we first consider how the economy behaves in
Stage 2, when all information is common knowledge and consumption takes place.
The optimal demand of the representative consumer for the good from island ω
whose price is Pω,Ω is given by
Pω,Ω
PΩ
= Pω,Ω =
(
Qω
QΩ
)− 1
z
. (38)
We have normalized the price level to PΩ = 1.
During Stage 1, firms set their optimal labor demands and unions set their
optimal wage demands. Firms want to maximize their profits conditional on their
information set, i.e.
maxE[PQ−WLi|ω]. (39)
Substituting [Qω/A(ω)]
1
α into (39) for Li gives us
max E
[(
P(ω,Ω)QΩ −W (ω)
(
Qω
A(ω)
) 1
α
)∣∣∣∣∣ω
]
. (40)
Taking the FOC of (40) with respect to Q, we get
E
[(
P(ω,Ω) − 1
α
W (ω)
(
Qω
A(ω)
) 1
α
−1
1
A(ω)
)∣∣∣∣∣ω
]
= 0,
which simplifies to:
E
[(
P(ω,Ω) − 1
α
W (ω)L(ω)
1
Qω
)∣∣∣∣ω] = 0. (41)
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Solving (41) for Li gives us
Li = αQi
(
Pi
Wi
)
, or, in log form,
li = logα + qi + pi − wi. (42)
Union i sets its nominal wage to minimize the expected value of its loss function:
min
wi
E
[
(wi − p)2 + γl2i |ω
]
, (43)
where the labor supply li is given by (42). Taking the derivative of (43) with
respect to the nominal wage gives us:
E{2(wi − p)− 2γ[logα + qi + pi − wi]|ω} = 0.
After solving for wi, we end up with union i’s optimal wage with the price level
normalized to unity:
Wi = L
d(γ)
i . (44)
The unions’ loss-minimizing wage depends on the firms’ profit-optimizing demand
for labor and the relative weight each union attaches to the employment objective.
Substituting the equilibrium wage from (44) and the equilbrium price from (38)
into (41) and using the definition of labor from the production function, we get
E
[(
Qω
QΩ
)− 1
z
− 1
α
(
Qω
A(ω)
) 1
α
(τ+1)
1
Qω
∣∣∣∣∣ω
]
= 0. (45)
Solving for Qω gives us the following proposition:
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, the strategy Q : Ω → R is the fixed point to the
following functional equation:
Q
τ+1
α
+ 1
z
−1
ω = αA(ω)
γ+1
α E
[
Q
1
z
Ω
∣∣∣ω] ∀ω, (46)
with
QΩ =
[∫ 1
0
Q
z−1
z
ω dΩ(ω)
] z
z−1
∀Ω.
Lemma 1 says that combining the production strategy Qω with the output function
QΩ returns the information set ωi = (ai, xi, yi).
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5.2.3 Best-Response Function
Suppose that, conditional on the type of island, the posterior of QΩ is log-normal
and its variance is independent of ω. Taking the log of (46) and using the log-
normality of Q, we infer that the equilibrium production strategy must satisfy(
γ + 1
α
+
1
z
− 1
)
logQω = logα +
γ + 1
α
logA(ω) + log{exp(E[logQ
1
z
Ω|ω]
+
1
2
(σ[logQ
1
z
Ω|ω])2}, (47)
where σ is the standard deviation of logQΩ. The right-hand side of the above
equation includes three terms due to the properties of log-normally distributed
variables. The expected value of logQΩ comes from:
E[logQΩ] = exp(mean of [logQΩ|ω] + 1/2(variance of [logQΩ|ω]).
Simplifying (47), we get:(
γ + 1
α
+
1
z
− 1
)
logQω = logα +
γ + 1
α
logA(ω) +
1
z
E[logQΩ|ω]
+
1
2
(
1
z
)2
V ar[logQΩ|ω],
where V ar[logQΩ|ω] = V ar[logQΩ] is a constant. After dividing both sides by(
γ+1
α
+ 1
z
− 1) we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The equilibrium production strategy is a unique fixed point to
logQω = ζ + (1−Ψ0)Ψ1a(ω) + Ψ0E[logQΩ|ω] ∀ ω (48)
with
Ψ0 ≡
1
z
γ+1
α
+ 1
z
− 1 < 1 and Ψ1 ≡
γ+1
α
γ+1
α
− 1 > 0
where Ψ0 is the degree of strategic complementarity and
ζ ≡ 1γ+1
α
+ 1
z
− 1
{
logα +
1
2
(
1
z
)2
V ar[logQΩ]
}
is a constant.
This gives us a best-response-like function for the equilibrium output produced on
any island that is also a game-theoretic interpretation for the equilibrium of the
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economy. The general equilibrium reduces to the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a
particular incomplete-information game. The relevant "players" for this game are
the different sectors, or islands, of the economy. Their "actions" are the production
levels in each island and their "types" are the local information sets. From this
information we can determine each player’s best response from Equation (48).
From (48), we can see that the coefficient Ψ1 must be positive while Ψ0 can be
positive or negative. Ψ1 determines the elasticity of local output to variation in
local productivity. Ψ0 determines the elasticity of local output to variation in
expected aggregate output.
5.2.4 Strategic Complementarity
The degree of strategic interaction among islands is controlled by Ψ0. When
Ψ0 > 0, this can be interpreted as the degree of strategic complementarity, or,
when Ψ0 < 0, the degree of substitutability. When 0 < Ψ0 < 1, it measures
the degree of strategic complementarity in production choices. Higher expected
aggregate income implies a higher expected demand for the products of each sec-
tor, increasing the returns to each island. This "demand-side" effect is generic
to any economy featuring Dixit-Stiglitz preferences and is the source of strategic
complementarity. The degree of the effect is controlled by z, which represents the
elasticity of substitution across commodities of different sectors. As the fraction
1/z increases, there is more complementarity between goods, making the demand
for any one good increasingly inelastic. Ψ0 > 0 is the most empirically likely case
for business-cycle frequencies.
Note that Ψ0 depends not only on z, but also on γ and α. As unions place a
lower weight on employment stability relative to price level stability (leading to a
lower γ), Ψ0 increases. The the real wage does not change even with expectations of
increasing aggregate output, so firms can keep wages low while hiring more workers,
leading to an increase in firms’ profits. The same incentive applies when α is large,
meaning that production is increasing in an approximately linear fashion. A lower
γ and a higher α contribute to greater strategic complementarity. The parameters
γ and α also affect how sensitive the elasticity of local output is to variations in
local productivity, given by Ψ1, and matter for equilibrium allocations even when
strategic complementarity is low. Since z only affects Ψ0, it makes sense to think
of strategic complementarity as being controlled by z, the elasticity of substitution
or by the strength of trade linkages across sectors.
Given the log-normal specification for the shock and information structure, we
reach the following closed-form solution for equilibrium production:
Proposition 4. The equilibrium level of output is given by
logQω = ϕ0 + ϕaa+ ϕxx+ ϕyy
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where
ϕa = (1−Ψ0)Ψ1
ϕx =
{
(1−Ψ0)κx
(1−Ψ0)κx + κy + κ0
}
Ψ0Ψ1
ϕy =
{
(1−Ψ0)κy
(1−Ψ0)κx + κy + κ0
}
Ψ0Ψ1
and aggregate output is given by
logQΩ = ϕ
′
0 + ϕa¯a¯+ ϕηη (49)
where
ϕa¯ = ϕa + ϕx + ϕy and ϕη = ϕy
Proof. We begin with a guess that the equilibrium production strategy occurs
in the log-linear form q(a, x, y) = ϕ0 + ϕaa + ϕxx + ϕyy for some coefficients
(ϕ0, ϕa, ϕx, ϕy). If we plug Qω into (49) we get:
logQΩ = ϕ
′
0 + (ϕa + ϕx + ϕy)a¯+ ϕyη
= ϕ′0 + (ϕa + ϕx)a¯+ ϕy(a¯+ η)
= ϕ′0 + (ϕa + ϕx)a¯+ ϕyy
where
ϕ′0 = ϕ0 +
1
E[a¯]
(
z − 1
z
)
1
2
(ϕa + ϕx)
2E[a¯](σ2a¯) (50)
In (50), (z − 1)/z comes from the outer exponent in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
function. We divided (50) by the expectation of the aggregate supply shock as
x is different for each sector. After computing the mean of private information
over all the sectors and we obtain the expressions for the mean and variance of
E[a¯] from the log-normality specification of the shock and information structure.
Simplifying (50) further, we end up with:
ϕ′0 = ϕ0 +
(
z − 1
z
)
(ϕa + ϕx)
2
2
[
ϕ2x
κξ
+
ϕ2x
κx
+ 2
ϕaϕx
κx
]
It follows that QΩ is log-normal with expected value
E[logQΩ|ω] = ϕ′0 + (ϕa + ϕx)E[a¯(Ω)|ω] + ϕyy (51)
and variance
V ar[logQΩ|ω] = (ϕa + ϕx)2
(
1
κ0 + κx + κy
)
, (52)
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where
E[a¯(Ω)|ω] = κ0
κ0 + κx + κy
µ+
κx
κ0 + κx + κy
x+
κy
κ0 + κx + κy
y. (53)
Substituting (53) into (51) gives us:
E[logQΩ|ω] = ϕ′0+
(ϕa + ϕx)
(
κ0
κ0 + κx + κy
µ+
κx
κ0 + κx + κy
x+
κy
κ0 + κx + κy
y
)
+ ϕyy (54)
Substituting (54) into (48) leads to:
logQω = ζ + (1−Ψ0)Ψ1a+
Ψ0
{
ϕ′0 + ϕyy + (ϕa + ϕx)
(
κ0
κ0 + κx + κy
µ+
κx
κ0 + κx + κy
x+
κy
κ0 + κx + κy
y
)}
(55)
In order for (55) to be of the form logQ(a, x, y) = ϕ0 +ϕaa+ϕxx+ϕyy for every
(a, x, y), it is necessary and sufficient that the coefficients (ϕ0, ϕa, ϕx, ϕy) solve the
following system:
ϕ0 = ζ + Ψ0
{
ϕ′0 + (ϕa + ϕx)
κ0
κ0 + κx + κy
µ
}
ϕa = (1−Ψ0)Ψ1
ϕx = Ψ0(ϕa + ϕx)
(
κx
κ0 + κx + κy
)
ϕy = Ψ0ϕy + Ψ0(ϕa + ϕx)
(
κy
κ0 + κx + κy
)
Substituting ϕa into ϕx gives us:
ϕx = Ψ0[(1−Ψ0)Ψ1 + ϕx]
(
κx
κ0 + κx + κy
)
= Ψ0(1−Ψ0)Ψ1
(
κx
(1−Ψ0)κx + κ0 + κy
)
=
(
(1−Ψ0)κx
(1−Ψ0)κx + κ0 + κy
)
Ψ0Ψ1.
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Substituting ϕa and ϕx into ϕy gives us:
ϕy = Ψ0ϕy + Ψ0
[
(1−Ψ0) +
(
(1−Ψ0)κx
(1−Ψ0)κx + κ0 + κy
)
Ψ0Ψ1
](
κy
κx + κ0 + κy
)
= Ψ0Ψ1
[
(1−Ψ0)κx + κ0 + κy + Ψ0κx
(1−Ψ0)κx + κ0 + κy + κx
](
κy
κx + κ0 + κy
)
= Ψ0Ψ1
(
κy
(1−Ψ0)κx + κ0 + κy
)
,
The expression for the final coefficient ϕ0 comes from the elements in equation 55
that are not multiplied by a, x or y. Therefore, the unique solution to this system
for (ϕa, ϕx, ϕy) is
ϕa = (1−Ψ0)Ψ1
ϕx =
{
(1−Ψ0)κx
(1−Ψ0)κx + κy + κ0
}
Ψ0Ψ1
ϕy =
{
(1−Ψ0)κy
(1−Ψ0)κx + κy + κ0
}
Ψ0Ψ1
The coefficient ϕ0 is uniquely determined from
ϕ0 = ζ + Ψ0
{
ϕ′0 + (ϕa + ϕx)
κ0
κ0 + κx + κy
µ
}
in combination with with the definitions for (ζ, ϕ′0) and the expression for V ar[logQ]
in (52).
5.2.5 Information Dispersion and Strategic Complementarity
Proposition 4 gives us a closed-form solution for the equilibrium production strat-
egy as a log-linear function of local productivity a, local private information x,
and the public information released by the central bank y. The dispersion of in-
formation is relevant to the business cycle if and only if Ψ0 6= 0. When Ψ0 = 0,
local activity does not depend on expectations of aggregate activity:
logQω = ϕ0 + Ψ1a(ω) and
logQΩ = ϕ
′
0 + Ψ1a¯(Ω).
When Ψ0 6= 0, E[logQΩ|ω] becomes important. The within-sector noise in lo-
cal markets increases dispersion in employment levels between sectors, decreases
the homogeneity of output between sectors and decreases relative prices. These
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differences cannot be justified only by the idiosyncratic variations in local produc-
tivity levels. The level of precision in the information the central bank releases
to the public, κy, contributes to aggregate fluctutations that are not connected to
aggregate productivity.
The stronger the strategic complementarity (Ψ0) the more the equilibrium level
of output in any given island (logQω) depends on local forecasts of aggregate
output (E[a¯]) and the less it depends on current local fundamentals. This is because
as Ψ0 increases from 0 to 1, ϕa = (1 − Ψ0)Ψ1 decreases so that a(ω) has less of
an impact on the equilibrium level of output. Additionally, as Ψ0 increases, the
values of ϕ0 (which includes the expected value of a¯), ϕx and ϕy become larger.
These changes in the coefficients mean that the equilibrium output of each sector is
influenced more by the expectations of a¯, x and y, and therefore by their respective
signal precisions κ0, κx and κy. Local productivity a(ω) will have a relatively small
part in the sectors’ expectations of logQΩ and logQω. Stronger complementarity
induces firms and unions to rely more on common sources of information, making
the central bank’s signal and the common prior relatively better predictiors of
others’ activity.
As more transparency induces the central bank to pay greater attention to its
inflation target relative to its output gap, Jensen (2002) finds that the optimal
degree of transparency often involves a tradeoff between credibility gains and flex-
ibility losses. He assumes that inflation expectations are formed at the beginning
of each period, which is what happens in the model examined in this section. An
increase in transparency is therefore good if the credibility of the central bank’s
inflation target is lacking. Additionally, an increase in stabilization leads to a
reduction in the optimal level of transparency.
For any given Ψ1, in terms of relative output,
∂ϕx
∂Ψ0
< 0 and
∂ϕy
∂Ψ0
> 0.
As the degree of strategic interaction increases, firms and unions base their ex-
pecations more on public information (ϕyy) and less on private information (ϕxx).
This result is similar to the conclusions from James and Lawler’s model, in it is
possible for an increase in transparency to lead to a decrease in public welfare.
Private agents ignore parts of their information sets because they are paying more
attention to public information and not enough attention to their private informa-
tion. When strategic complementarity in decision making becomes stronger, these
tendencies to weight private and public information differently in predictions of
future output increase.
A final effect of note is that the stronger the strategic complementarity between
sectors, the greater the noise-driven aggregate fluctuations and the smaller the
technology-driven fluctuations. The anchoring effect to the prior explains why
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aggregate output responds less than initially expected to innovation in technology,
while the heightened sensitivity to noisy public information explains why aggregate
output responds more to noise. Thus, for a given Ψ1, in terms of aggregate output,
∂ϕa¯
∂Ψ0
< 0 and
∂ϕη
∂Ψ0
> 0
Finally, note that aggregate employment is given by
logL(Ω) = const+
1
α
(logQΩ − a¯)
= const+
1
α
[(ϕa¯ − 1)a¯+ ϕττ ]
Therefore, increases in the magnitude and/or frequency of noise-driven fluctuations
occur together with positive co-movements in employment, output and consump-
tion, are not in a causal relationship with underlying productivity shocks, and are
closely related to shifts in expectations about aggregate demand.
One of the main properties of this model’s equilibrium, that output levels re-
spond more to public information than they do to private information, presents im-
plications that mesh nicely with the findings of James and Lawler’s model. James
and Lawler proposed, in their discussion about unions operating with monopolis-
tic competition, that if the central bank and the unions place the same relative
weight on employment stabilization, greater transparency is associated with more
volatile employment and will result in losses for both the central bank and the
private sector. If, as in Angeletos and La’O’s model, public information has a
greater effect on output expectations than does private information, fluctuations
in the central bank’s information releases would result in significant volatility in
aggregate employment and output. This suggests that the central bank would be
better off operating under a system in which it is required to keep the price level
relatively stable. It could do this by refraining from operating under full trans-
parency, as the actual shock level would not be apparent to the general public
when it occured, and so individual firms and unions would not drastically change
their wage and employment demands.
Jensen (2010) comes to the same conclusion, finding that greater transparency
on the part of the central bank leads to a more diciplined monetary policy. This
is good if the bank lacks credibility, but bad if the bank authorities are fre-
quently making adjustments for shocks which the public views as impermanent
self-correcting.
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6 Conclusion
Since the beginning of modern central banking, monetary authorities around the
world have made great strides in opening up the inner workings of their finan-
cial toolboxes to the public. Although the concept of an opaque financial sector
brings to mind unethical behavior and shady characters, it appears that releasing
all information on central bank behavior immediately does not always increase
economic efficiency and welfare. Examining how wage and employment demands
change in the face of ever increasing amounts of information is imporant, since it is
not likely for central banks to become less transparent in the foreeable future. As
more central banks switch to publishing their instruments’ forecasts, the increase
in available data will make it easier to examine what major effects, if any, highly
transparent monetary authorities have on economic outcomes.
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